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GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
THE ASIAN CRISIS: SOME LESSONS FOR THIRD
WORLD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
By Jong H. Park*
INTRODUCTION
Very broadly, one of the main causes of the Asian crisis lies in the
ever-rapidly increasing globalization currently taking place in the world econo-
my. The Asian countries (and for other non-Asian countries as well) have been
simply too slow to fully appreciate the new challenges posed by the rapidly
globalizing financial markets and, consequently, they have been too slow to for-
mulate appropriate responses. Globalization has increased the speed and magni-
tude of market reaction, and consequently has magnified the costs of bad poli-
cies and weak, inefficient institutions.
In 1996, there was a record capital infiow of $93 billion into Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Korea (hereafter called the Asian 5).
But the following year 1997 saw a net outflow of $12 billion. This amounted to
a reversal of $105 billion, equivalent to 11 percent of the combined GDP of
the Asian 5. This was the greatest reversal of private capital flows ever
recorded in the world economy, and represents "the most significant geo-fman-
cial adjustment to date in the relatively new era of globally integrated capital
markets.*'! ii ^̂ ^̂ s this reversal of capital flows that precipitated the Asian cur-
rency crisis, eventually pushing "miracle" economies into a dramatic fmancial
meltdown with serious economic, social and political consequences.
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To be sure, the root causes of the Asian financial crisis go much
beyond this reversal of capital flows. Among others, this crisis stemmed from
over-investment, unhealthy corporate financial structure and inefficient finan-
cial system. Unlike the case with Latin America in the 1980s, the Asian crisis
did not originate from a macroeconomic financial insolvency caused by over-
consumption, fiscal imbalance, and rampant inflation. The Asian 5 (four South-
east Asian countries of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, and
Korea) had no such problems. Their government budgets were generally in bal-
ance, and inflation was low. The IMF austerity programs imposed on these
countries in exchange for the "bailout" were essentially the same old medicine
for a new illness. These measures were applied to the Latin American countries
when they defaulted on their loans in 1982.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to examine the causes of the
Asian financial crisis and to draw some lessons and implications for a series of
issues, which may be of particular relevance to the Third World developing
countries. These issues include: the appropriate role ofthe International Mone-
tary Fund as an international agency in charge of helping member countries to
maintain fmancial stability; the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime
and use of restrictions on private capital flows in the face of rising
globalization; and the debate on the East Asian model of economic develop-
ment.
GLOBALIZATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
Financial Market Liberalization in Developing Countries
Since the early 1990s, fmancial markets in the world have been inte-
grating rapidly. This has led to surges in private capital flows to developing
countries and other "emerging market economies." Major advances in informa-
tion technology have reduced transaction costs. Foreign investors saw higher
long-term rates of return and the new opportunities for risk diversification in
developing countries. At the same time, ongoing economic reforms and fman-
cial liberalization have made developing countries more attractive to overseas
investors.
The greater integration of international financial markets improved
access to the pool of global saving for many developing countries. Many coun-
tries have been able to invest more and hence grow faster than otherwise, while
generating higher yields for international investors and giving them the opportu-
nity to reduce risk through portfolio diversification. Thus, the process of finan-
cial market integration and the associated increase in international capital
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mobility has been viewed as a welcome development.
One of the arguments for the case of an open, integrated financial mar-
ket is that of reducing the cost of capital, A market that is open to global
investors reduces the cost of capital for local companies by allowing stockhold-
ers to achieve efficient portfolio diversification. Stock markets also lower the
cost of capital by increasing the liquidity of investments. For developing coun-
tries, opening their capital markets to foreign investors will bring about the
spillover effects in the form of technology, managerial and organizational sys-
tems, which will help boost efficiency in the domestic market. For instance, the
new competition from foreign financial institutions that accompanies the open-
ing of the capita! market will invariably put pressure on host countries to find
ways for improving financial services, and so forth. In addition, foreign
investors will demand greater transparency and improved disclosure rules that
will enable them to monitor corporate performance and capital allocation.^
It should be noted, however, that this discussion of the potential
benefits of financial integration and increased international capital mobility
abstracts from foreign exchange risk and problems associated with the intemie-
diation of foreign capital through the banking and financial systems of recipient
countries. In fact, it is these two factors that can expose recipient countries to
the possibility of abrupt reversals of international capital flows.
(ireat Reversal of Capital Flows to Emerging Markets
Outstanding economic performance of the Asian "miracle economies'*
in tbe late 80s and the early 90s attracted a surge in private capital inflows into
these emerging economies. That surge in capital inflows helped fuel the
increase in the bank credit-financed investment boom. At the same time, how-
ever, the surge in private foreign capital made these economies extremely vul-
nerable to a financial panic. According to the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), the total net private capital fiows into the Asian emerging markets during
1994-96 amounted to a whopping $184 billion. In 1996 alone, $93 billion
entered the Asian 5. With the onset of the crisis in the second half of 1997. mar-
kets overreacted and international investors panicked. Off they ran with $105
billion! As mentioned previously, this was the greatest reversal of private capital
fiows ever recorded to date. Even Stanley Fischer, deputy-managing director of
the IMF, conceded: "lM]arkets are not always right. Sometimes inflows are
excessive, and sometimes they may be sustained too long. Markets tend to react
fast, sometimes excessively."^ Of course, one cannot blame multinational banks
and other international investors for taking advantage of new opportunities in
the emerging markets for better returns and for diversification of their invest-
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ment portfolios. But. it tnust be noted that both lenders and borrowers are equal-
ly guilty of making reckless lending and investment decisions without careful
risk analysis. Thus, Catherine Mann of the Institute for International Economics
conceded: "Limiting international capital flows is not without cost. Yet, it is
clear that international capital markets have not worked well over the last sever-
al years, including not just the obvious turmoil of the last two years but also the
breakdown of the European Monetary System in 1993. Avoiding such systemat-
ic financial distress requires that borrowers and lenders accurately price and
manage risks in their portfolios.'"* So, we all are responsible for the crisis in one
way or another.
THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: FROM "MIRACLE"
TO "MELTDOWN"
The Thai Meltdown and Contagion
The February 5'̂ " of 1997 in Thailand—that was the date when the
Asian meltdown actually began. On that day, Somprasong Land, a Thai proper-
ty developer, made an announcement that the company had failed to make a
scheduled $3.1 million interest payment on its enormous eurodollar bond loan,
effectively entering into default. Who would have thought this incident would
eventually force the Thai government to allow the iyaht to float on July 2nd,
1997. after 13 years of pegging its currency to the US dollar at Bt 25, With that
decision of the Thai government, the catastrophic Asian contagion began.
The reversal of foreign capital, combined with the flight of domestic
funds, caused massive depreciations of the currencies of the Asian 5 — the
Indonesian rupiah by 75 percent, Malaysian ringgit and Philippines peso by 40
percent, Thai baht and Korean won by almost 50 percent. These crashes in the
currency were soon followed by dramatic stock market falls in these countries
as well as in Hong Kong and Singapore. Hardly anyone had expected that the
event unfolding in Thailand would eventually lead the "Asian Miracle" into the
"Asian Meltdown" in such a-short time span and with such a high speed.
Government officials, business executives, and academicians were all
pondering just what went wrong in East and Southeast Asia. The "miracle"
economies in the region were contracting much faster than anyone had antici-
pated. What we heard about the events unfolding in Southeast and East Asia
were nothing but horror stories. Hundreds and thousands of business firms went
bankrupt, including some big chaebol in Korea. Unemployment soared in a
country where lifetime employment was a norm. How could this happen to the
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"miracle economies"? Does this mean the end of the East Asian Miracle? Many
thought that the end had come.
The East Asian Meltdown
The seeds of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis were sown during the
previous decades when East and Southeast Asian countries were experiencing
unprecedented economic growth, which has transformed their economies into
the East Asian "miracle economies." Although there bave been and remain
important differences hetween individual countries, tbe Asian 5 shared a num-
ber of common elements, all contributing directly or indirectly to the crisis.
They include credit-fueled investment boom, weak and unsound banking sector
and financial system, pegged exchange rate regime, currenl account deficits,
and loss in investor confidence.
Credit-Fueled Investment Boom—During the !990s. GDP growth in
the region exceeded 5 percent per annum and often was closer to 10 percent.
Sucb strong economic growth and the expectation that growth would continue
led to an enormous increase in investment. The investment shares in GDP in
most Asian countries increased substantially between 1988 and 1996. Between
1990 and 1996, for instance, gross domestic investment grew by over 16 per-
cent per year in Indonesia, 16 percent in Malaysia, 15.3 percent in Thailand, 7.2
percent inn Korea. This compares to the investment growth in the U.S, by 4.1
percent and 0,8 percent in all high-income countries.^ Much of this unprece-
dented increase in investment was financed by bank credit, and was concentrat-
ed either in areas with highly volatile returns such as stocks and real estate or in
areas where substantial capacity already existed, thus leading to over-expansion
and excess capacity.
Inefficient Bank-Centered Financial Systems -One of the elements
shared by tbe Asian 5 has been tbe weakness of their bank-centered financial
systems. The banks in these countries simply failed to develop appropriate pro-
cedures for evaluating risks when extending loans. There was little incentive to
develop such procedures since the bank managers were subject to direction by
the government authorities, and they expected the government to support their
borrowers. Tbe government-directed, discretionary policy of credit allocation
for rapid economic growth may have achieved its goal. But the financial institu-
tions, including commercial banks, became simply a "silent partner" in the pro-
cess of economic development. "Financial repression," characteristic of the East
Asian model for development, has been responsible for the unsound, weak, and
inefficient financial systems in these countries. Surveillance of bank operations
was inadequate, and prudential regulation of the baking system was lax. espe-
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cially with respect to capital adequacy requirements. In addition, banks did not
have adequate capacity for project evaluation in lending practices, especially in
the aftermath of increased financial liberalization in these countries. As a result,
when economic conditions worsened abruptly, the quality of the bank assets
deteriorated fast, producing non-performing loans.
Exchange Rate Misalignment — Mainly as a way of inducing foreign
capital, all of the Asian 5 currencies had, in one way or another, been aligned
with or pegged to the U.S. dollar or a basket of currencies dominated hy the
U.S. dollar. This linking of the official exchange rates to the U.S. dollar had one
major drawback. As the value of the dollar changed, so did the exchange value
of these currencies relative to other currencies that are not tied to the dollar such
as the Japanese yen and the German mark.
The impact of the exchange rate misalignment can be traced back to
the Plaza Accord of 1985. As the Japanese yen began its rapid appreciation
against other currencies, particularly the U.S. dollar, the relative costs of pro-
duction rose in Japan. In response, Japanese firms shifted their production activ-
ities to overseas, mainly to Korea and Taiwan. To counteract the blow of this
outward FDI to the domestic economy, the Japanese government used aggres-
sive monetary expansion. This created giant asset bubbles in Japan and massive
capital outflows into Korea and Taiwan. By the late 1980s, these two countries
came under similar pressures as a result of appreciating Korean won and Tai-
wanese dollar. To combat these pressures so as to maintain the exchange value
of their currencies in terms of the U.S. dollar, they relied on aggressive mone-
tary expansion. The results were asset price bubbles at home and large capital
outflows, this time, primarily to Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and
Indonesia.
The seeds of the financial turmoil were sown in the mid-1990s when
the U.S. dollar started lo appreciate against other currencies, especially the
Japanese yen. The Asian currencies tied to the dollar rose in value and made
their exports more expensive to non-dollar buyers and their imports from non-
dollar areas cheaper. The weakening yen drastically reduced the export competi-
tiveness of the Asian 5 vis-a-vis that of Japan. The result was to increase the
current account deficits for the Asian 5. Downward pressures created by the
increased current account deficits necessitated increased government interven-
tion to maintain the exchange value of their currencies, depleting their foreign
exchange reserves. All this was on top ofthe adverse impact ofthe devaluation
of the Chinese renminbi yuan in 1994.
Coincidence and Compounding— None of these elements that are usu-
ally put forward as contributing factors are, by themselves, enough to explain
the source and extent of the Asian crisis. The interaction of these elements pro-
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duced a conjuncture of problems, compounding the sources of vulnerability of
these economies to external shocks. Thusly, Grenville sums up the story of the
"Asian meltdown":
Large capital inflows led, more-or-less inevitably, to exces-
sive credit growth and growth ofthe fmancial sector, because
it was not possible to sterilise them fully. The large flows
meant, also, that there was easy funding available for projects
(both good and bad), and that asset prices were bid up. Simi-
larly, the large capital flows made it difficult to raise interest
rates higher (they were already quite high), for fear of induc-
ing even more capital inflow. High domestic interest rates, at
the same time, persuaded many borrowers to take the risk of
tapping into attractively lower foreign currency-denominated
borrowing. Further, with quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes in
these countries, there was little incentive for institutions bor-
rowing in foreign currencies to hedge their deht. These issues
should have been recognised as sources of vulnerability, but
the focus was on growth, without enough concern about •'
resilience in the face of variance in growth.^
The crucial combination was the large volatile foreign capital flows
and fragile financial systems. These two elements, in combination, made the
Asian emerging market economies extremely vulnerable to changes in investor
confidence. Financial markets are supposed to constantly digest and evaluate
information to produce a price — an exchange rate — which reflects the "fun-
damentals." In the Asian emerging markets, however, "the more nebulous con-
cept of 'confidence' dominated 'fundamentals.'""^ Thus, Jeffrey Sachs of the
Harvard Institute for Development lamented: "In a matter of just a few months,
the Asian economies went from being the darlings of the investment community
to being virtual pariahs. There was a touch ofthe absurd in the unfolding drama,
as international money managers harshly castigated the very same Asian
governments they were praising just months before . . . . But, as often happens
in fmancial markets, euphoria turned to panic without missing a beat. Suddenly,
Asia's leaders could do no right. The money fled."^
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SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE ASIAN CRISIS
AND THE THIRD WORLD
The Asian financial crisis has rekindled the debate on the role of inter-
national institutions, especially that of the IMF. The crisis has raised a series of
questions regarding international financial architecture, including the gover-
nance of the international financial system and exchange rate regimes. The cri-
sis has also opened up the debate on the alternative models or approaches for
economic development suitable for the Third World developing countries in the
era of globalization,
The Role of International Institutions
In the mid-1990s even before the onset of the Asian financial crisis,
some observers were suggesting that the IMF should be closed down. The crux
of the argument was that in a world of floating exchange rates and globalized
fmancial markets, an agency such as the IMF was no longer needed. Opinions
differ widely on whether the IMF has a systematic role as under the Bretton
Woods system—^such as "managing global exchange rates, coordinating
macroeconomic policy, and seeking to ensure that the quantity of international
reserves was adequate."^
In "bailing out" the three crisis-stricken Asian countries—Thailand,
Indonesia and Korea, charges were made against the IMF for prescribing the
same old medicine for a new illness. Take Korea as an example. The immediate
cause of the financial crisis in Asia in general and Korea in particular was the
abrupt withdrawal of foreign capital, especially short-term hot money flows.
Especially for the case of Korea, the crisis was clearly a case of temporary illiq-
uidity rather than fundamental insolvency. The IMF adjustment program called
for a severe contractionary macroeconomic policy of higher taxes, reduced
spending, and high interest rates, raising a specter of slow or no economic
growth and of massive layoffs. The program was applied in the 1980s, when
macroeconomic imbalances, government profligacy and hyperinflation were
behind the Latin American debt crisis. The prescription was little more than the
same old medicine for a new illness, and thus ill-suited as a cure for the trou-
bled Southeast Asian economies in general and for the Korean economy in par-
ticular."^ Unlike the currency crises in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, the
currency crisis in Korea spread irrationally from the other currency crises,
which were compounded by the so-called "reverse free rider" behavior of for-
eign lenders. In a sense, therefore, the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis can be
characterized as an "international liquidity crisis as much as a fundamental eco-
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nomic crisis."" What Korea needed was the rollover of their short-term loans.
The IMF could have taken initiatives in convincing the international financial
community to provide coordinated action hy creditor banks in the G-7 {read,
developed countries) to restructure Korea's short-term debts, lengthening their
maturity and providing temporary credits to help meet the interest obligations.'^
Others charge that the IMF "bailout" programs for the Asian countries
involve tax money being used to "bail out"—rather than "bail in"—multination-
al banks and fmancial institutions in the North (read, developed countries or the
G-7). These banks and institutions had extended loans "recklessly" without
careful risk analysis to private banks and business firms in emerging markets.
They were equally responsible for the Asian fmancial crisis—a crisis of "inter-
national liquidity" in this era of globalization. What the IMF was doing in East
Asia was a replay of the deht crisis of the 1980s in Latin America, when the
Fund recycled public funds through indebted governments in Latin America to
the coffers ofthe heavily exposed hanks and financial institutions in the North.
Other critics of the IMF contend that the Fund's approach to Asia was
simply a "continuation of its policies since the early 1980s, when, together with
the World Bank, it imposed programs of 'structural adjustment' on over 70
Third World developing countries." The indebted countries in Latin America
and Africa were allowed to use the IMF-released funds to service their debts
only on condition that they accept programs of radical liheralization, deregula-
tion, and privatization.'3
In its rescue package for Korea, the IMF demanded a fundamental
overhaul of the Korean economy. There is no denying that many of the struc-
tural reforms that the IMF included in its program for Korea (in exchange for
the $57 billion bailout) would improve the long-term performance of the Kore-
an economy. Failure to undertake some of the badly needed structural reforms
earlier was, no doubt, one of the root causes of the Korea's fmancial crisis.
However, "a nation's desperate need for short-term financial help does not give
the IMF the moral right to substitute its technical judgments for the outcomes of
the nation's political process."'** The structural reforms "demanded" by the IMF
were those well recognized by Korea, hut they were not needed for Korea to
gain access to capital markets. The legitimate political institutions of the coun-
try, not an international agency such as the IMF, should determine the nation's
economic structure and the nature of its institutions. But, then, one has to recog-
nize that significant institutional changes that have taken place in Korea in
recent years would not have been enacted in the absence of the painful and (to
many Koreans) "humiliating" implementation ofthe IMF regime.
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The International Financial Architecture '
The Asian crisis has shown once more that there are serious systematic
problems inherent with the current global monetary and financial arrangements
that we have. It has increased our awareness of the need for global governance
of international finance so as to prevent the recurrence of similar crises in the
future. One of the main problems with the current international financial system
is that there is no governance of international financial transactions similar to
that found in the area of international trade. The present structure is designed to
discipline international borrowers rather than international lenders. International
institutions and arrangements that we now have are designed to manage rather
than to prevent crisis. With ever-rapidly increasing degree of financial integra-
tion taking place in the world economy, the global impact of interest and
exchange rate policies has become much more important than before. There is
no effective surveillance mechanism in these areas. There is also a dire need for
the orderly workouts based upon rules and bankruptcy procedures that govern
international debtor-creditor relations. All countries in the international commu-
nity need to focus their attention to these issues as part of their efforts towards
improving the governance of international finance.
Among many proposals for strengthening the international financial
system, two questions stand out: One is the question of choosing appropriate
exchange rate regimes, and how flexible they should be. The other is the ques-
tion of liberalizing international capital flows, and how rapid it should be. The
recent Asian crisis has shown that in the world with increasing degree of capital
mobility, the traditional means of fixing the exchange rate do not work. The
goals of exchange rate stability and capital mobility are simply incompatible as
can be explained in terms of the so-called "open economy trilemma."'^
Alternative Foreign Exchange Regimes and the Open Economy Trilemma
Countries have three choices in determining the monetary linkage
between their economy and the rest of the world: (1) Flexible regimes where
countries let their currency float in the exchange markets against all other cur-
rencies; (2) Fixed regimes where they can fix the price of their currency against
a specific foreign currency or a basket of foreign currencies; (3) Intermediate
regimes where they let their currency float to some extent but intervening to
limit those fluctuations according to some pre-determined parameters such as
"target zones," "crawling bands," and so forth. Table 1 shows definitions of
nine exchange rate regimes out of three main categories, ranging from the most
flexible to the most fixed-rate commitment.
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TABLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES
FROM MOST FLEXIBLE TO MOST FIXED
Flexible Corner:
1. Free floating - the absence of regular intervention in the foreign
exchange market.
2. Managed float - the absence of a specific target for the exchange rate.
Intermediate Regimes:
3. Target zone or band - a margin of fluctuation around some central rate.
4. Ba.sket peg - fixing not to a single foreign currency but to a weighted
average of other currencies.
5. Crawling peg - a pre-announced policy of devaluing a bit each week.
6. Adjustable peg - fixing the exchange rate, hut without any open-ended
commitment to resist devaluation or revaluation in the presence of a
large balance of payments deficit or surplus.
Fixed Comer:
7. Truly fixed peg - fixing, committing to buy or sell however much
foreign currency is necessary at a given exchange rate, with a firm and
lasting intention of maintaining the policy.
S. Currency board - three defining characteristics: fixing not just by policy
but by law. hacking increases in the monetary base one-for-one with
foreign exchange reserves, and allowing balance of payments deficits to
tighten monetary policy and thereby adjust spending automatically.
9. Monetary union - the adoption of a foreign currency as legal tender.
This includes the special case of official dollarization.
Source: J.A. Frankel, The International Financial Architecture, Policy Brief No.
51. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. June 1999).
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The choice of exchange rate regime depends on the particular circum-
stances facing the country under question. One proposition is that countries
should move toward increased exchange rate flexibility. Those who take this
position point to the consequences of the futile attempts to maintain the fixed
rates in Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, and Brazil, which all ended in
costly currency crashes. Another proposition is that all countries should move
toward making institutional commitment to firmly fixing the exchange rate.
For instance, use of currency boards in Hong Kong and Argentina has enabled
these economies to weather successfully the storms of financial crises in
recent years.
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, however, there appears to
be an increasing consensus on the view that the intermediate exchange
regimes are not sustainable in a world with large scale capital flows, and con-
sequently, countries are increasingly forced to choose either free-floating or
firm-fixing. The logic behind this proposition can be explained by the open
economy trilemma. The principle says that with its open economy, a country
simply cannot achieve all three goals of exchange rate stability, monetary
independence, and financial market integration simultaneously; it must give
up one of three goals at a given time. As shown in Figure 1, one can attain
any pair of attributes at an apex, but not all three attributes because one can-
not be on all three sides simultaneously. Two goals of exchange-rate stability
and monetary independence can be attained at the apex marked capitai con-
trols, in other words, the goal of financial market integration with increased
capital mobility must be sacrificed. Likewise, at the point marked monetary
union, two goals of exchange rate stability and capital mobility can only be
achieved at the expense of giving up the autonomy of monetary controls.
With freely floating exchange rate regime {at the apex marked pure float),
currency volatility is the price for attaining goals of monetary independence
and free capital mobility.
The globalization of financial markets has increased the degree of
cross-border capital movements in recent years. In terms of the open economy
trilemma diagram, this trend of greater financial integration has pushed most
countries toward the lower part of the triangle. If further financial liberalization
efforts push these countries to the bottom line of the triangle, the choice will be
narrowed down to choosing either free-floating or firm-fixing as in the case of a
monetary union. As emphasized by Jeffrey Frenket. however, "there is nothing
to prevent the country from choosing an intermediate solution between floating
and monetary union" even under perfect capital mobility.'^
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Source: Jeffrey A. Frankel, The International Financial Arcliiiecitire. Policy Brief W51
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, June 1999); Asia Development Bank, "The Financial
Crisis in Asia," in Asian Development Outlook 1999 (Manila: Asia Development Bank, 1998),
pp. 22-46.
Free-floating allows a country to maintain its freedom in conducting
monetary policy and other macroeconomic policies since it does not have to use
them to defend the exchange rate. However, markets can overshoot the econom-
ic fundamentals: They can push the value of currency far belou' its underlying
economic value, generating inflationary pressures and raising debt servicing
costs, or they can push the exchange value far above the true value, hurting the
country's export competitiveness and therefore its trade balance. On the other
hand, fixed exchange rates can help countries avoid those costs if the govern-
ments can successfully establish the rate at a sustainable level and convince the
markets of their willingness and ability to maintain the rate at that level. Fixed
exchange rates also reduce the transaction costs of international trade and
153
JOURNAL OF THIRD WORLD STUDIES, FALL 2002
investment. Moreover, the option for adjusting the fixed rate according to some
predetermined parameters provides countries with "an additional policy tool
that can be used to correct an excessive external deficit or surplus."''' In fact,
this has been the most important rationale for adopting a variety of intermediate
exchange rate regimes (see Table 1) by many countries, including the Asian 5,
since 1976.
Successful defense of a fixed rate can be costly, requiring a country to
raise interest rates and slow down its economy to avoid speculative attack. The
main trouble, however, is that governments may try to maintain a rate at unsus-
tainable level for too long until private capital flows will eventually force deval-
uations or revaluations. Such "forced" adjustments in exchange rate can become
very devastating and costiy, as was amply demonstrated by the Asian crisis. In
the era of globalization of financial markets with huge private capital flows,
there is a growing consensus that countries can enjoy the benefits of fixed
exchange rates only in two ways. They can either impose and maintain exten-
sive capital controls in order to directly limit their vulnerability to speculative
attack or they can establish a currency board as adopted in Hong Kong and
Argentina (or read, dollarization).
Financial Liberalization and Capital Controls
One lesson we have learned from the Asian crisis is that opening up
the financial market before nurturing a sound financial system and institutions is
a very risky business. Korea, for instance, has overestimated the potential bene-
fits of joining the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment)—sometimes referred to as a "rich boys' club." One of the requirements
for joining the club was to liberalize its financial market.
Several lessons can be drawn from the Korean case of premature finan-
cial market liberalization. First, domestic financial systems must be liberalized
before opening to foreign capital. By and large, the East and Southeast Asian
countries were more or less in the same boat as was Korea. Ceilings on interest
rate, government-directed lending, insider relationships between hanks and bor-
rowers have alt served to channel eredit without regard for rates of return, thus
leading to misallocation of resources. Foreign capital inflows were channeled
through the same process of intermediation, leading to excessive investments
and maturity mismatches in assets and liabilities. Second, financial liberaliza-
tion requires strict bank regulation and supervision in order to prevent a reversal
in capital flows. This includes the imposition of ceilings on foreign currency
exposure for Ihe banks. Third, free capital movement and pegged exchange
rates are simply a dangerous mix: Goals of capital mobility and the stability of
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foreign exchange rates are not compatible. A fixed exchange rate regime pre-
vents central banks from using higher interest rates to keep the economy from
overheating, but it also encourages foreign currency borrowing when interest
rates overseas are lower than ihose at home. Fourth, financial markets require
reliable information and transparency to function eificiently. If foreign lenders
had better information about the borrowing activities of Korea's private sector,
they would have pulled back their funds earlier, and the impact of the abrupt
withdrawal of funds on the economy would have been much less severe.
Many in the economics profession argue against capital control mea-
sures. They argue that the financial market is the best device for allocating glob-
al capital efficiently among countries and between competing uses. Global capi-
tal markets will provide capital-needy countries with additional funds for their
growth, while allowing investors to diversify their portfolios. If capital is
allowed to flow freely, markets will reward countries that pursue sound eco-
nomic policies and pressure others to do the same. We all become beneficiaries
of free capital movement. The Asian crisis, however, has given us an important
lesson— that is, financial liberalization must come only after nurturing of the
incentive structure and capacity to regulate financial markets. Until then, vari-
ous measures for restricting capital flows may be in order.
The Tobin Tax—One way of limiting international capital flow is to
selectively tax capital account related transactions, such as the "Tobin tax" or
variants of it. Such a tax involves the differential taxation of foreign exchange
conversions arising from capital flows.'** The Tobin tax provides market partici-
pants with an incentive to take a long-term economic outlook ratber than short-
term hunches in buying and selling foreign exchange and securities. Traders
must pay a tax -say. O.I %—for every transaction so that they would buy or sell
only when the expected returns justify the additional expenses, resulting in
fewer transactions. One difficulty for implementing the Tobin tax. however, is
that all major currency trading countries must apply the tax at the same time.
Otherwise, traders could simply shift their transactions to tax-free countries.'^
Controls on Short-Term Capital Flows—One way of preventing the
possible unproductive use of foreign capital when channeled through the
domestic banking and financial system is to prohibit its entry by imposing capi-
tal controls. Capital control measures used by Chile, for instance, are not
designed to discourage infiow of foreign capital at large, but they are specifical-
ly aimed at discouraging short-term capital infiows. Local firms that borrow
abroad are required to keep 30% of all non-equity capital on deposit at the cen-
tral bank, interest free for one year. This deposit requirement is tantamount to a
tax on capital inflows with a maturity of less than one year; it is aimed at
encouraging firms to borrow more tor longer-term purposes. Studies have
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shown that such capital control measures in Chile have not adversely affected
the size of foreign capital inflows, but simply affected the composition of such
flows, although capital controls in Chile caused "a large increase in the cost ot
foreign financing for Chilean companies."
Chile also requires that any foreign money coming into Chile must stay
in the country for at least one year. This requirement has discouraged many
hedge funds and pension funds from investing in Chile at all. In the wake of the
Asian financial crisis, several countries have adopted capital controls. Among
them was Malaysia, which imposed currency controls and prevented foreign
shareholders from taking Iheir money out of the country for a year. Taiwan
dropped its plans for full liberalization of international capital flows by the end
of the year 2,000.
Financial liberalization is critical in this era of globalization for a coun-
try's long-term growth and development. But financial liberalization should fol-
low a sequence. The East Asian countries made the mistake of increasing their
vulnerability by wooing foreign capital through capital account convertibility
before addressing their fundamental financial weaknesses in a timely manner.
Whither the East Asian Model for Economic Development?
The Asian crisis has raised a series of questions about the efficacy and
sustainability of the so-called East Asian model for economic development.
Many questioned whether the model could be considered valid to be followed
by other developing countries in their pursuit of economic development. In fact,
some suggested that the Asian crisis has not only signified "the end of the Asian
miracle." but also signaled that the East Asian model has failed.
The debate on the validity of the model is not that simple, however.
For instance. South Korea and Taiwan are known to have followed the model
for their successful economic development efforts. This model of state-directed
capitalism seemed to combine the dynamic aspects of a market-oriented econo-
my with the advantages of centralized government planning and direction. The
model has been credited for transforming East Asian countries into an export
powerhouse and for producing spectacular economic growth, unheard of in the
past human history. While South Korea, along with other Southeast Asian coun-
tries, was hard hit by the crisis of 1997-98, Taiwan has not only avoided the
Asian financial contagion, but has also continued to grow at a respectable rate.
Why? Is the model itself in crisis or are there any alternative explanations for
the different outcomes of the Hast Asian model as followed by South Korea and
Taiwan?
To be sure, there is no established and agreed definition of the East
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Asian model of economic development.20 Compared to its Western counterpart,
however, the model has several distinguishing features. The most important one
is that governments play an important, proactive role in the process of industri-
alization and economic development. Both South Korea and Taiwan can be
characterized as what Chalmers Johnson called the "developmental state." in
which the state recognizes economic development as the primary goal and does
not hesitate to intervene in a market-oriented economy to achieve this goal.2'
As a capitalist state, the developmental state is committed to private property
and the market system. However, the market is closely governed by the govern-
ment bureaucrats who formulate and implement strategic industrial policies to
promote economic development. Both South Korea and Taiwan also promoted a
bank-based fmancial system under close government control. They also used
international trade as the primary means for economic growth and development.
Among other things, these commonalities shared by both South Korea and Tai-
wan help explain their phenomenal economic success achieved in the past three
decades.
Although South Korea and Taiwan are the prime examples of the East
Asian model of development, the approaches taken by the two in their applica-
tion of the model were different —a "Big is beautiful" type of approach in
Korea and a "Small is beautiful" type of approach in Taiwan. In South Korea,
economic policy was geared at achieving rapid economic growth whereas
macroeconomic stability was given higher priority in Taiwan. Big business con-
glomerates, known as the chaebol, emerged as the engine of growth dominating
the South Korean economy, while in Taiwan small and medium-sized enterpris-
es (SMEs) played a central role in economic growth and development. The dif-
ferent outcomes of the 1997-98 crisis for South Korea and Taiwan can be
attributable to these differences in policies and approaches undertaken by the
two in their application of the East Asian model of development.^^
In South Korea, the growth-first policy involved choosing winners
through the government-directed, discretionary policy of credit allocation
among business firms. The financial institutions were placed under government
control, and they became simply a "silent partner" in the process of economic
development. In this process of credit allocation, SMEs (small and medium
sized enterprises) were given little or no daylight. In Taiwan, on the other hand,
emphasis was placed on nurturing the spirit of individual entrepreneurship for
SMEs. It is these SMEs who laid a firm foundation for the sound fmancial sys-
tem and industrial organization in the Taiwanese economy. In the case of South
Korea, there is little doubt that the growth-first strategy with "financial repres-
sion" under the government-controlled financial system and the selection of pri-
oritized industries to be developed did serve the purpose of achieving the goal
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of rapid economic growth. But unfortunately, the strategy also helped to create a
group of giant industrial conglomerates, known as the chaebol, which by the
end of the 1970s had already become "too big to fail," dominating the South
Korean economy. In the 1980s and 1990s, the state deviated from its status as a
developmental state, and the chaebol became too big and powerful to control,
eventually pressuring the government to prematurely deregulate and liberalize
financial markets. This greatly reduced the government's ability to control and
regulate international short-term capital flows, known as "hot money." The gov-
ernment, rather than directing and guiding business firms towards its develop-
mental goals, began to resemble an agent of the chaebol.'^^
As in South Korea. Taiwan also followed the East Asian model of
development, but emphasis was placed on economic growth with stability.
Accordingly, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime implemented economic policies
aimed at preventing inflation, financial instability and the concentration of pri-
vate capital. To maintain monetary stability, the government nationalized tbe
banking system and placed tbe entire financial sector under its control. As a
result of this tight regulation and control of the financial sector and the policy of
avoiding excessive concentration of private capital, Taiwanese firms had to rely
on their own funds, small loans from a number of banks, and money borTOwed
from relatives and friends. This reliance on traditional household networks for
financing has been largely responsible for sbaping the Taiwanese industrial
structure: First, it has limited the size of business firms to be smaller because for
Taiwanese firms tbere were no buge concessionary or special loans made avail-
able under tbe growth-first strategy as in South Korea. Second, the debt-equity
ratios for Taiwanese firms tended to be much lower than those of the South
Korean counterparts since banks were not willing to lend large sums to individ-
ual firms and they could only borrow so much from the traditional household
networks.
Taiwan's anti-inflationary policy, along with a high-interest-rate policy,
was successful in boosting capital accumulation and growth. Unlike South
Korea. Taiwan did not have to depend heavily on foreign borrowing to finance
domestic investment. In fact, during the period 1971-1994. Taiwan was able to
finance its entire gross domestic capital formation out of internally generated
domestic savings.̂ ** Tbis, of course, greatly reduced its vulnerability to foreign
debts and external shocks. While South Korea relied heavily on foreign borrow-
ing and blocked foreign direct investment (FDI), Taiwan opened its door to FDI.
Inward FDI into Taiwan not only contributed to capital formation but also
served as an important vehicle for technology transfer.^S
Most important of all. the Taiwanese government never lost its autono-
my, and remained a developmental state, maintaining its "commanding heights"
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in the economy. Unlike in South Korea where the powerful chaebol wielded a
strong influence over government policy, Taiwanese firms were not allowed to
consolidate their economic power, and they were constrained to conduct their
financial and industrial operations in a highly flexible, widely diversified man-
ner. It was these small-scale, fiexible and informal household network groups in
Taiwan that became highly instrumental in easing the adaptation of the econo-
my to changing circumstances and external shocks.^^
At least two lessons can be drawn from the South Korean and Tai-
wanese experiences with economic development. One, economic stability can-
not be sacrificed for rapid economic growth. Two, a strong government with an
economic bureaucracy that is highly capable but still independent of the busi-
ness community is an essential institutional prerequisite for successful policy
formulation and implementation of the East Asian model of development.27
Some argue that the Asian crisis has demonstrated a limited life for the
interventionist mode! for economic development. The model worked out suc-
cessfully for Japan and East Asian countries, including South Korea and Tai-
wan, while the following conditions prevailed: First, countries must have a high
household savings rate; there must be a political consensus that the benefits of
financial repression (favored firms receiving low-cost loans) exceed the costs to
consumers or those investors who must use informal or curb capital market;
there must be rapid increases in GDP, both to build political support for the
intervention and to mask its inefficiencies; countries must run trade surpluses in
order to build foreign exchange reserves. And finally, countries should be in the
early stages of economic expansion, when capital accumulation matters more to
growth than technological progress.''̂ ** Once economic growth begins to slow
down because of accumulating inefficiencies and a diminishing marginal prod-
uct for capital, the inefficiencies would become harder lo hide, investor opti-
mism would begin to fall, and political support would erode. The interventionist
model for development of the East Asian type carries with it the seeds of its
own destruction, and the world integration makes it no longer viable in the
long~run.29
However, one must keep in mind that a premature relaxation of inter-
vention by the state may bring a disaster. One important contributing factor to
the Asian crisis is not "too much of state intervention" but rather "lack of it." As
in Korea, for instance, "the crisis stemmed from the uncontrolled debt-financed
expansion of the chaebols. The government's abdication, in the face of chaebol
power, of activist state coordination of private-sector investment and its relax-
ation of controls over the private sector's foreign borrowing were the key fac-
tors that precipitated the crisis."30 In several of the Asian crisis countries, badly
managed financial liberalization lifted restrictions on bank borrowing and lend-
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ing before putting in place a sound regulatory framework. Many of the prob-
lems arose not because governments did too much, but because they did too lit-
tle, and because "they themselves had deviated from the policies that had
proved so successful over preceding decades."^' In South Korea, as the chaebol
became too big to fail and their power increased, the state's power eroded, and,
unfortunately in the 1980s and 1990s, the state "evolved in such a way that it
came to resemble a racketeering state rather than a developmental one."^- In
Taiwan, however, unlike in the case of South Korea, the government never lost
its autonomy even after significant measures of liberalization were introduced
in the financial and industrial sectors. The state was able to remain a develop-
mental state, still occupying the "commanding heights" in the Taiwanese econo-
my. ,• • •:••
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to understand better the causes of the Asian financial
crisis—proximate as well as fundamental—a host of new hypotheses and expla-
nations have been advanced in the academic circle, and they are still in the mak-
ing. There is, however, one cause that stands out among many. That is the rapid-
ly increasing globalization of business activities and markets continually taking
place in the world economy. The Asian countries (and for all non-Asian coun-
tries as well) have been simply too slow to fully appreciate the new challenges
and risks posed by the rapidly globalizing financial markets. Consequently, they
have been too slow in formulating appropriate responses and policies. Global-
ization has increased the speed and magnitude of the market reactions. It has
magnified the costs of bad, inconsistent policies and weak, inefficient institu-
tions. In today's global environment, the forces of globalization are simply
beyond one's control. In short. Pacific Asian countries have simply fell victim
to globalization.33
Globalization, if properly managed, may help push some developing
countries into modernity and affluence. But as the Asian financial crisis sug-
gests, embracing global financial markets can also be highly dangerous and
costly. The Asian crisis has shown how important it is to have effective state
institutions that are capable of successfully mediating the impact of globaliza-
tion on economic development. "Heightened exposure to world markets will
only become a true lever of economic development in the presence of institu-
tions able to mitigate market failures and manage the competitive challenges
and domestic dislocations produced by openness. Contrary to conventional wis-
dom, however, the absence of the requisite institutional conditions is not neees-
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sarily self-correcting."^'^
The severity and contagiousness of the Asian financial crisis under-
scored the need for reforming the international financial system. Numerous pro-
posals have been put forward. The G~7 (read, developed countries)-led reform,
however, ignores the problems of the supply side of international finance, and
concentrates its efforts on reforming the financial and corporate sectors of
developing countries. Again, as in the case of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-
95, the appetite for radical reform of the international financial system has
receded considerably in the wake of economic recovery of the crisis-hit coun-
tries. From the perspective of developing countries, therefore, it appears that
they will remain vulnerable to future financial crises even if they faithfully
carry out the kinds of structural reform recommended by the IMF and the World
Bank. Given this reality, developing countries may have no choice but to devel-
op their own defense mechanism by establishing a system of capital controls
and by adopting an exchange rate regime that lies somewhere between the two
extremes —free floating and fixed.
The Asian crisis hardly signifies the end of the East Asian model of
economic development. Too drastic measures of liberalization and opening up
may weaken the existing relation-based governance structure of the economy
before a new and more rule-based governance mechanism could function,
Korea and Thailand may be a case in point. In the early 1990s, financial liberal-
ization as well as political liberalization in these countries proceeded, perhaps
too fast and too early, before an effective rule-based governance structure was
put in place. In short, "[t]he dismantling of too many existing relation-based
mechanisms in so short a period can damage the future potential of economies
at an early stage of development to continue to catch up," while relation-based
governance is still more cost-effective than rule-based governance.3-'' For many
Third World developing countries, the relation-based East Asian model of eco-
nomic development, if properly adopted and executed as in the case of Taiwan,
can be effective in facilitating catching-up in the early stage of economic
growth and development. In the wake of the Asian crisis, the credence of the
model has been seriously questioned, but the model itself is not in crisis. It is
the strategy or approach to be used in its application that must be carefully
weighted and evaluated.
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